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THE LEGAL ATTACK ON COST
CONTAINMENT MECHANISMS: THE
EXPANSION OF LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICIANS AND MANAGED CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
ALLISON FABER WALSH*

Jane Doe, a woman in her thirties, notices what she believes
is a mole on her arm becoming larger and darker in color.' Concerned with recent talk and numerous articles on the threat of
skin cancer, Jane becomes worried about the mole and decides to
seek the medical advice of a doctor. Through her employer, Jane is
a member of a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)' which

* J.D. Candidate, January 1999.
1. The events in the hypothetical are based on the facts of an actual
situation a board certified dermatologist faced when he sought approval from
a for-profit HMO for the removal of pilar tumors on his patient's scalp. Laurie
Zoloth-Dorfman & Susan Rubin, The Patient as Commodity: Managed Care
and the Question of Ethics, 6 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 339, 342 (1995). However,
the physician in the actual situation felt strongly that a pathology exam of the
tumors was necessary and sent the specimen to the lab for testing at his own
expense. Id. He then documented the HMO's denial of the test and sent his
documentation to his local medical society. Id. A panel of doctors presented
this case to a bioethics committee as an example of the dilemmas physicians
face when trying to maintain quality of care in a managed care setting. Id. at
343. See also McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 546 Pa. 463 (Pa.
1996), for a lawsuit setting forth similar facts as those presented in the hypothetical.
2. HMOs are health care systems responsible for the delivery, management and financing of health care services to a group of coyered members.
PATRICIA A. YOUNGER ET AL., MANAGED CARE L. MAN. 2 (1996). HMOs are
responsible for arranging medical services and treatment through health care
providers and for covering the medical costs of the treatment. GORDON K.
MACLEOD, AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 4 (2d ed. 1993). The
costs of treating the subscribers are prepaid and either the HMO, the health
care providers, or both are at financial risk for the overuse of medical services.
James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of MCOs: An Overview of MCOs, 81 ILL. B.J.
584, 584 (1993). Typically, in an HMO, patients who subscribe or enroll in the
plan pay a fixed annual premium. YOUNGER, supra, at 2. Enrollees must
then obtain their medical treatment from a limited list of providers approved
by the HMO. CHARLES G. BENDA & FAY A. ROzOvSKY, MANAGED CARE AND
THE LAW LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 2.4.1, at 11
(1996). The HMO provides a predetermined set of basic health services to the
enrollee through its approved providers. Id. The services provided to the en-
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provides and pays for her medical treatment and care. To receive
medical benefits, Jane's HMO mandates that she make an initial
consultation with a primary care physician contracted with her
HMO before seeking the advice of a specialist.!
rollee typically include required medical services, hospitalization and emergency care. Freiburg, supra, at 585. However, HMOs usually do not cover
unnecessary medical treatment such as dental treatment or treatment for
cosmetic purposes. Id. HMOs contract with health care providers to administer health care to enrollees. Id. at 586.
A preferred provider organization (PPO) is another popular system
used to deliver health care at reduced rates. Barbara A. Noah, The Managed
Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost
Containment?,48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1225 (1997). In a PPO, a payer such
as an insurer, employer or administrator contracts with an organization of
health care providers to deliver discounted health care to patients enrolled in
the plan. Id. Unlike an HMO, PPOs do not use the capitated reimbursement
system. William J. Bahr, Comment, Although Offering More Freedom to
Choose, "Any Willing Provider"Legislation is the Wrong Choice, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 557, 56 2 (1997). PPOs reimburse providers at a discounted fee-forservice rate which forces the PPO to bear the financial risk of overuse of estimated medical services. BENDA & ROZOVSKY, supra, at 12. Therefore, the
financial risk is never shifted to the provider in a PPO. Id. An enrollee in a
PPO is not required to receive medical treatment from a physician in the PPO
network. PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 14
(2d ed. 1993). However, PPOs provide incentives such as reduced deductibles
and co-insurance payments to encourage enrollees to utilize providers contracted with the PPO. Id. Insurers can form PPOs to provide services to enrollees or providers themselves can form PPOs in an attempt to acquire contracts from insurers, employers or administrators. BENDA & RozOvSKY,
supra, at 12.
A point of service (POS) plan adopts the concept of managed care while
at the same time maintains some aspects of the traditional health care system
by allowing enrollees more freedom to choose providers. Id. As in HMOs and
PPOs, POS plans provide medical services to a group of enrollees at a reduced
cost. YOUNGER, supra, at 2. However, unlike HMOs and PPOs, the participants have an option to use providers not contracted with the plan. Id. at 7.
When an enrollee needs medical treatment, the enrollee has a choice of
whether to obtain medical services from a participating provider or from a
provider outside of the plan. Id. However the enrollee suffers greater costs if
he chooses to take advantage of the freedom to choose his own provider. Id.
Deductibles and co-payments are increased and coverage is decreased if the
enrollee decides to use a non-participating provider. Id.
3. Under an HMO plan, enrollees are limited in their choices of physicians. Lisa Panah, Common Law Tort Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations, 29 AM. HosP. ASs'N J. HEALTH & HOSP. L., 146 (1996), available
in LEXIS, GenMed Library, Med & Health Jnl File. Enrollees must choose a

physician that is contracted with the HMO. Bahr, supra note 2, at 557. The
primary care physician act as the patients "gatekeeper" and becomes solely

responsible for the enrollees medical treatment. Deven C. McGraw, Note,
FinancialIncentives to Limit Services: Should PhysiciansBe Required to Disclose These to Patients?,83 GEO. L.J. 1821, 1823-24 (1995). An HMO enrollee
must initially seek treatment from her gatekeeper for any medical problems
she is experiencing before seeking the medical expertise of a specialist.
MANAGING MANAGED CARE IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE - THE PHYSICIAN'S
HANDBOOK FOR SUCCESS AND SURVIVAL 25-26 (Kay Stanley ed., 1996)
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After examining the mole, the primary care physician determines that the mole should be surgically removed and tested to determine whether the mole is a malignant melanoma. Before removing Jane's mole, the primary care physician is required to
receive authorization from Jane's HMO for payment of the surgery
and testing of the mole. The primary care physician calls the
HMO for authorization of the procedure. The HMO physician consultant approves the procedure to remove the mole, but informs
the primary care physician that the HMO will not approve payment for a pathology examination of the mole. The primary care
physician explains to the HMO consultant that there is a slight
chance the mole is a malignant melanoma. Despite the primary
care physician's efforts, the HMO physician consultant concludes
that the pathology exam is not medically necessary and denies the
physician's request for the biopsy. The primary care physician
removes Jane's mole and informs her of the HMO's decision to
deny payment for a pathology examination of the mole.
One year later, Jane Doe returns to her primary care physician complaining of a swollen lymph gland behind her ear. The
lymph gland is surgically removed and a biopsy is authorized by
the HMO. The biopsy reveals a malignant melanoma undoubtedly
related to the previously removed scalp lesion. The cancer is advanced and all further medical care is fruitless. One year after the
discovery of the cancer, Jane Doe dies.
Who is responsible for Jane Doe's death? Is Jane's HMO liable for denying approval for the initial pathology examination of
the mole, thereby allowing the malignant melanoma to remain
undetected and spread for, one year? Or, is Jane's primary care
physician liable for not sending the skin graph to pathology for examination? Before managed care,' the answer was obvious. Physicians were held exclusively responsible for the care and treatment of their patients. Today, however, the answer is not so
obvious due to the growth of managed care organizations (MCOs)
in the health care industry.'
[hereinafter Stanley]. The gatekeeper is the patient's advocate and must act
on the patient's behalf. Id. He is responsible for initial treatment and diagnosis, making and following up on referrals, providing information about
treatment to the patient, and making treatment decisions. Id. A gatekeeper
provides overall treatment and guidance to his patients and is accountable for
the patient's treatment. Id. at 25-26.
4. The American Medical Association (AMA) defines managed care as:
"The control of access to and limitations on physician and patient utilization
of services by public or private payers or their agents through the use of prior
and concurrent review for approval of or referral to service or site of service,
and financial incentives or penalties." John J. Ingelhart, Health Policy Report: The American Health Care System, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 962, 965
(1992).
5. Ralph 0. Bischof & David B. Nash, Managed Care Past, Present, and
Future,80 MED. CLINIcS N. AM. 225, 225 (1996).
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Escalating health care costs forced the concept of managed
care to rapidly enter the American health care delivery system.'
The dramatic effect of the implementation of MCOs is apparent
throughout the health care system.7 Managed care attempts to
lower and contain medical costs by controlling the treatment of
patients and by implementing various cost-containment mechanisms.'
This Comment discusses various cost containment mechanisms MCOs implement to lower health care costs and discusses
their impact on traditional medicine. It also addresses successful
and unsuccessful legal attacks upon cost containment mechanisms, and analyzes theories of liability used against physicians
and MCOs when patients such as Jane Doe die or are injured as a
result of the MCO's efforts to lower healthcare costs.
Part I provides a background of the development of managed
care. Part II explains the various types of cost containment
mechanisms MCOs implement to achieve the goal of lowering or
containing health care costs. Part III analyzes the various expanded theories of liability against physicians and MCOs and focuses on cases that have addressed these causes of action. Finally,
Part IV proposes solutions on how to continue the use of cost containment mechanisms without decreasing the quality of health
care. Further, Part IV addresses liability concerns that arise when
cost-controlling measures result in the death or injury of a patient.
Although this Comment focuses on the discussion of cost containment mechanisms implemented by MCOs and their effect on
health care, an understanding of the concepts of managed care is
essential to understanding the effect of cost containment mechanisms.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGED CARE

In an attempt to curb escalating health care costs, policymakers, the government, insurers and employers adopted the concept
of managed care.' Although many view the emergence of managed
care as a new method for the delivery of health care, managed care
is not a new concept."' Prepared managed care plans were used in
the nineteenth century by slave owners who needed to provide
medical attention to their slaves, by powerless individual workers
concerned with adequate health care, and by large industries, such
as mining, lumbering, and railroading, who were forced to deal
6. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical
Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1720-21 (1987).
7. YOUNGER, supra note 2, at 1.
8. David Orentlicher, Paying PhysiciansMore to do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 156 (1996).
9. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1821-23.
10. Zoloth-Dorfman & Rubin, supra note 1, at 339.
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with work-related injuries. 1 Section A discusses the development
of traditional medicine throughout the years and addresses this
country's move from traditional fee-for-service medicine to managed care. Section B examines what managed care means and
what managed care attempts to achieve.
A. TraditionalFee-For-ServiceMedicine

Prior to the advent of managed care, medical care and treatment was rudimentary. 2 Primitive medical technology and limited medication restricted a physician's treatment options." Physicians could offer patients little more than house calls,
observation, basic surgical procedures and rudimentary medications. 4 Reimbursement for medical treatment was also basic. 56
People who could afford medical treatment were treated at home.
After the physician provided treatment to the patient, the physician would set a fee and the patient would pay the fee out-ofpocket." This simple reimbursement method was, and still is, referred to as fee-for-service. 8
11. Id. at 339-40. See also Bischof & Nash, supra note 5, at 226 (discussing

the emergence of prepaid plans for employers of large industries).
12. E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility,
20 AM. J. L. & MED. 79, 80 (1994).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. E. Jane Ross, Refusing to Pay for Health Care-PartI (of III): Evolution
of the Third-PartyPayment System, PROGRESS IN CARDIOVASCULAR NURSING,
Winter 1996, at 42.
17. Morreim, supra note 12, at 80.
18. MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE MONEY & MORALS 2 (1993). In the United

States, the traditional reimbursement system for physicians is called fee-forservice. Freiburg, supra note 2, at 584. Under a fee-for-service reimbursement system, a medical provider determines an appropriate fee for his services and then either bills the patient directly or bills the patient's insurance
company. Id. at 584-85. The fee-for-service system creates two contracts, a
contract between the patient and physician and a contract between the patient and the insurance company. Id. at 585. While the insurance company
may receive the bill from the physician, it cannot lower the charged fees
though the insurance company may elect not to cover all of the costs. Id. The
patient is then responsible for any charges not covered by the insurance company. Id. The physician, therefore, always receives reimbursement for any
services provided to his patients. Id.
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, cost is not an issue for
physicians. Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program:What Its Effect Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1339, 1359 (1994). Physicians who make more referrals or order excessive tests receive greater profits under a fee-for-service system. Morreim, supra note 12, at 80. When considering different methods of treatment or various diagnostic tests under the fee-for-service system, doctors do not hesitate
to provide the patient with the most extensive, thorough and innovative medical services or treatments. Id. If a particular test or method of treatment
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In the early 1900s the number of hospitals increased and patients admitted themselves into hospitals rather than receiving
treatment at home.19 As a result of the Depression, many sick and
injured people were unable to pay for treatment at a hospital and
were forced to stay at home and remain untreated. 0 Recognizing
this problem, insurance companies created private health insurance in an attempt to deliver health care at affordable costs." In
the late 1920s and early 1930s the concept of an HMO emerged
when industrial groups began to offer prepaid health care to their
employees.22 After World War II, wage and price freezes and tax
exemptions for employers prompted employers to begin offering
their employees health insurance programs."2
provides even a five percent benefit to the patient, but at a much greater cost
than a more inexpensive though possibly less effective alternative, physicians
almost always provide the more expensive treatment. Schwartz, supra, at
1359. Practicing defensive medicine insures the patient is thoroughly treated
and helps shield physicians from medical malpractice suits. Id. at 1361. See
also Kenneth R. Pedroza, Note, Cutting Fat or Cutting Corners,Health Care
Delivery and its Respondent Effect on Liability, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 399, 404

(1996) (discussing defensive medicine). Neither physicians nor patients are
concerned about costs under this system because a third party payer who is
uninvolved in the decision making about the treatment assumes the costs.
Schwartz, supra, at 1359.
19. Ross, supra note 16, at 42. In the mid-1800s hospitals were only for the
poor who could not afford house calls. Id. It was not until the late 1880s that
hospital stays became an accepted method of health care delivery. Id. In
1873, 178 hospitals existed in the United States with a total of 35,064 beds.
Id. In 1909, the number of hospitals reached 4359 totaling 421,065 beds and
by 1929, 6665 hospitals existed totaling 907,133 beds. Id.
20. Id.
21. Christine C. Dodd, Comment, The Exclusion of Non-Physician HealthCare Providersfrom IntegratedDelivery Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate

Business Practice?,64 U. CIN. L. REV. 983, 983 (1996).
22. Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 285, 291

(1995). In 1927, the Community Hospital of Elk City, Oklahoma first introduced the concept of an HMO as a medical cooperative. Id. In the mid-1930s,
a corporation called Kaiser-Permanete developed a system whereby its employees received all medical services through their employer. JOHN F.
MCCALLY, CAPITATION FOR PHYSICIANS UNDERSTANDING AND NEGOTIATING
CONTRACTS TO MAXIMIZE REIMBURSEMENT AND MANAGE FINANCIAL RISK 1

(1996). Kaiser hired a group of physicians and paid them five cents per month
for each Kaiser employee. Id. The physicians were hired by Kaiser to provide
medical care in a cost-efficient manner. Thomas J. Maxwell, A View from a
Doctor's Office, 13 DEL. L. 33, 34 (1995).

23. Morreim, supra note 12, at 80. As health insurance became more
popular, the price of insurance increased and the number of uninsured people
grew. Pedroza, supra note 18, at 404. The workforce provided health insurance as an employee benefit leaving many unemployed, elderly and poor people without a means of paying for medical services. COLODIA OWENS,
MANAGED

CARE ORGANIZATIONS

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL

PRACTICES AND OTHER PROVIDERS 2 (1996). Therefore, in an effort to help the

unemployed with medical costs, the federal government created Medicare and
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Although health insurance companies became responsible for
indemnifying the expense of patients' medical care, the method of
reimbursement remained fee-for-service.' Physicians exerted exclusive control over the diagnosis and treatment of patients and
had complete discretion to choose the method and cost of treatment.25 The physician submitted a bill for services to the health
insurance company and received payment without question. The
insurance company insulated both physician and patient, provid2
ing no incentive for the physician or patient to maintain costs.

6

Both physicians and patients, under the fee-for-service system,
benefited from increased services and treatment.27 Patients received any and all treatment available that promised any benefit,
regardless of how incremental the benefit was to the patient.28 Increased medical services and treatment provided physicians with
more profits and a shield against medical malpractice lawsuits.
Therefore, the fee-for-service system encouraged physicians to over
utilize treatment. Physicians handsomely profited from excessive
services rendered to patients and had no incentive to contain

costs. 30
Eventually, escalating health care costs and innovative medical technology forced insurers, policymakers and employers to
consider a new method for the delivery of health care. 1 In 1973,
Medicaid in 1966. Id.
Medicare provides health services to the elderly, while Medicaid provides health services to the poor. Ross, supra note 16, at 43. Blue Cross was
given the administrative responsibility of determining reimbursement for
physicians. Id. Under Medicare, physicians are reimbursed for "customary,
prevailing [and] reasonable charges" and individual states determine Medicare's reimbursement schemes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(1)(a) (1994). These reimbursement schemes assure physicians that reasonable costs of medically necessary services are compensated. Ross, supra note 16, at 43.
24. MCCALLY, supra note 22, at 2.

25. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1822. See also McCALLY, supra note 22, at 2
(detailing a physician's freedom under a fee-for-service reimbursement system).
26. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1822.
27. Pedroza, supra note 18, at 401.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to
Physicians,22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399,400 (1996).

31. Bischof & Nash, supra note 5, at 226. Kenneth Pedroza offers reasons
for the dramatic rise in health care costs over the years. Pedroza, supra note
18, at 401-03. He suggests that reimbursement, defensive medicine, technology and treatment care are factors that have contributed to escalating health
care costs. Id.
Under a traditional fee-for-service reimbursement system, Medicare or
insurance companies reimburse physicians for medical services and treatment. Id. at 401. A third party payer reimburses most services and treatment rendered to patients under this system which, therefore, provides in-

centives for physicians to increase services to patients.

Id. Any test or
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Congress passed the Health Maintenance Act 2 to promote the
growth of the first MCO, the HMO.33 The Health Maintenance Act
procedure is not only a benefit for the patient but also a profit for the physician. Id. There is no incentive for the physician to contain costs. Id. An increase in charges for medical services and an increase in the number of procedures performed per patient means more money for the physician. Id.
Therefore, Pedroza claims the fee-for-service reimbursement system results in
an increase in medical bills. Id.
Secondly, Pedroza suggests that defensive medicine is another reason
for rising costs in the health care industry. Id. A physician under a fee-forservice system may provide excessive tests and perform excessive procedures
which have a small benefit to patients but will nonetheless provide greater
protection against medical malpractice lawsuits. Id. at 401-02. Pedroza
states that while it is difficult to determine if defensive medicine has substantially effected escalating health care costs, physicians spend more money
when over treating patients as a means of avoiding liability. Id. at 402.
A third factor in the rise of medical costs is the increase in innovative
medical technology. Id. There are incentives for physicians under a fee-forservice system to request more tests and procedures using the latest, most
expensive technology because reimbursement is based on the procedure. Id.
Physicians also use innovative expensive technology because it is more advanced, produces more reliable results and provides greater accuracy. Id.
Finally, the type of health treatment physicians provide to patients is
another factor that attributes to escalating health care costs. Id. at 403. Preventative care is providing medical care to patients in order to keep them
healthy. Id. The theory behind preventative medicine is that if patients are
informed on how to remain healthy and if ailments are caught before they
reach advanced stages, physicians can prevent patients from getting sick. Id.
Treatment care, on the other hand, is treating a patient when symptoms have
advanced into a disease or ailment that must be treated. Id. Opponents argue that in a fee-for-service system physicians practice treatment care rather
than preventative care because treatment care is more profitable. Id. Advocates for managed care argue that the use and emphasis of preventative care
is one reason managed care lowers health care costs. Id.
32. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e17 (1994) (amended 1976, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988). The purpose of the Federal
HMO Act is to provide financial assistance to HMOs as long as they meet prescribed qualifications. Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 22, at 291-92. The
federal government approves loans and grants to entrepreneurs interested in
creating HMOs that meet federal requirements. Dodd, supra note 21, at 984.
In order to receive financial assistance from the federal government, an HMO
must abide by certain requirements set forth in the Act. Bearden & Maedgen,
supra note 22, at 291. The rules and regulations provide a structure that the
HMO must follow to assure quality health care is being provided. Bahr, supra
note 2, at 562. The Act also requires HMOs to assume all responsibility for
health care services on a prospective basis. Panah, supra note 3. However,
the Act permits physicians contracted by the HMO to assume financial risk
for the rendering of health care services. Id.
33. Bishof & Nash, supra note 5, at 227. Between 1970 and 1990 enrollment in HMOs escalated from 3.6 million to 35 million. McGraw, supra note
3, at 1823. HMOs were implemented as the first system to attain the goal of
lowering health care costs, however, new delivery systems such as PPOs and
POS plans have since emerged. Id. All of these delivery systems attempt to
limit medical treatment and are considered MCOs. Id. See supra note 2 for a
definition and discussion of HMOs, PPOs and POS Plans.
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marked the beginning of the era of managed care and the concept
of providing affordable quality health care to participants enrolled
in a managed care plan.3
B. The Shift Into Managed Care
The United States introduced the concept of managed care to
control the delivery of quality health care and lower health care
costs.' Managed care attempts to provide quality health care in a
cost efficient manner.36 MCOs monitor physicians' treatment of
patients and implement cost control systems to limit costly medical
services.37
Unlike the traditional fee-for-service system that depends
upon a contract between the patient and the insurance carrier,
MCOs rely upon a contract between the health care provider and
the MCO. 8 Health care providers contract with MCOs to provide
health care to a group of individuals.3 9 Various types of managed
care plans that deliver health care to subscribers include, HMOs,
PPOs, and POS Plans. 0 To achieve the goal of lowering health
care costs, MCOs implement various cost-containment mechanisms to limit treatment to patients and provide incentives4 1to encourage physicians to render medical services at lower costs. '
II. TYPES OF COST-CONTAINMENT MECHANISMS IMPLEMENTED BY
MCOS
Managed care plans implement various cost containment
mechanisms to achieve their primary purpose of lowering medical
costs. Although there are many different types of cost containment mechanisms, the most common are utilization review, capitation and payment incentives. ' Section A of this Part describes
34. Bischof & Nash, supra note 5, at 227.
35. Stanley, supra note 3, at 3-4.
36. Id.
37. Bischof & Nash, supra note 5, at 230.
38. Freiburg, supra note 2, at 585.
39. BENDA & RozovsKY, supra note 2, at 7.
40. See supra note 2 for a definition of liMOs, PPOs, and POS Plans.
41. William A. Chittenden III, MalpracticeLiability and Managed Healthcare:History and Prognosis,26 TORT & INS. L.J. 451, 476 (1991).
42. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1826-28. MCOs formerly used a drastic
mechanism known as gag clauses to preclude physicians from criticizing managed care plans. Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation,Advances in Medical
Technology, and the Advent of a New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM J.L. &
MED. 331, 350 (1996). "Gag clauses are provisions in physicians' contracts
which prevent them, explicitly or implicitly, from giving patients information
about treatment options that may not be covered by their health plan." AMA
Takes Stand Against Health Plan 'Gag'Rules, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, July 12,
1996, availablein 1996 WL 382081. In effect, a gag clause constrains free and
unfettered discussion between a physician and her patient. Julia A. Martin &
Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of 'Gag Clauses' in Phy-
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utilization review, Part B explains capitation and Part C details
three forms of payment incentives.
A. Utilization Review

Utilization review is a cost containment mechanism implemented by MCOs that attempts to lower health care costs by reducing the number of unnecessary medical procedures, hospital
stays and tests for each patient. 3 MCOs hire a board of physicians
and/or nurses to review each patient's records on a case-by-case
basis." The physician consultant reviews the patient's medical records to determine if the physician's treatment is medically necessary and thus covered by the plan."' Through utilization review,
sician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 434 (1996). It prohibits or restricts
a physician from informing his patient of available treatment options, disclosing the nature of the physician's employment agreement with the managed
care organization, soliciting patients outside the managed care organization or
engaging in the critical debate over health care. Id.
The scope and nature of gag clauses vary in nature. Barry M. Manuel,
Physician Liability Under Managed Care, 182 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 537, 541
(1996). Gag clauses may be oral or written. Id. MCOs often incorporate written gag clauses as boilerplate language in a physician contract. Id. A common gag clause provides, in pertinent part, that, "the physician agrees not to
exert influence on Members to switch their enrollment to another form of
healthcare coverage, or to involve Members unnecessarily in Plan administrative or procedural issues, but instead, agrees to seek problem resolution
through the Plan grievance procedures." Id. Another written gag clause
states, "[d]o not discuss proposed treatments with [members] prior to receiving authorization from the plan." Martin & Bjerknes, supra, at 444.
No matter how gag clauses are used, they limit the free flow of communication between physician and patient, undermine trust and fidelity that
the relationship once had and crystallize all the concerns that consumers have
with managed health care. Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Tilting at HMOs, CAL.
L., Feb. 1997, at 85. Presently, 16 states have passed legislation prohibiting
the use of gag clauses. Id. In addition, in December 1996, the Department of
Health & Human Services added a new federal regulation stating that any
contract that limits a doctor's ability to advise and counsel a Medicare patient
violates Medicare rules. Id. As public concern grows over the use and impact
of gag clauses, federal and state legislation will be enacted prohibiting their
use. Id.
43. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1826-27. Utilization review is an element of
the system of Utilization Management. David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger,
The Impact of Managed Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care and their
Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693, 1694 (1996). Utilization Management "permits
the managed care program to coordinate providers and provider services by
measuring treatment, identifying inappropriate use of services or facilities
and making medical necessity recommendations on which payers rely to make
coverage and payment decisions." YOUNGER, supra note 2, at 1. Utilization
review constitutes the most explicit intrusion into the physician-patient relationship because life and death decisions between physician and patient are
trivialized by the utilization review's cost benefit analysis. Mechanic &
Schlesinger, supra, at 1695.
44. YOUNGER, supra note 2, at 2.
45. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1826.
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MCOs seek to prevent unnecessary medical treatment and deliver
more cost-effective alternatives to treatment.48 Utilization review
4 7
can be performed prospectively, concurrently or retrospectively.
A managed care company performs prospective utilization
review prior to the administration of treatment. 8 The reviewer of
the claim determines whether the treatment for the patient is
medically necessary. 9 If treatment is not medically necessary,
the
5
reviewer refuses to reimburse the cost of the treatment. 0
Concurrent utilization review occurs during the course of the
treatment to determine whether a test, referral or hospitalization
is medically necessary." The utilization review consultant monitors the patient throughout treatment to determine the medical
necessity of each procedure. 2
The final type of utilization review, called retrospective review, occurs after treatment is rendered." If the review indicates
that a medical service provided to a patient was unnecessary, the
managed care company will deny payment or coverage.5
Utilization review is not the only cost containment mechanism employed to lower health care costs. MCOs also commonly
apply a payment scheme called capitation to minimize medical
costs.
B. Capitation
The traditional fee-for-service system is thought to encourage physicians to over utilize medical services, thereby increasing
health care costs.' To eliminate excessive use of medical services,
MCOs use alternative methods to compensate physicians such as
capitation.'
Capitation is a form of reimbursement whereby a

46. Id.
47. YOUNGER, supra note 2, at 1.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. YOUNGER, supra note 2, at 1.
54. Id.
55. Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 158.
56. Eleanor D. Kinney, ProceduralProtections for Patients in Capitated
Health Plans, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 301 (1996). Although many health
care markets use capitation as the primary method of reimbursement, capitation has not yet surpassed the traditional fee-for-service reimbursement
system. John D. Blum, The Evolution of Physician Credentialinginto Managed Care Selective Contracting, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 173, 174 (1996). On a
national level, capitation is not the dominant method of payment, however,
third party payers view it as a way to control escalating medical costs and to
shift the financial risk to physicians. Id. Managed care entities have begun to
dominate health care in the United States, and thus capitation has become a
popular method of reimbursement for health care providers. Kinney, supra
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third party payor compensates a contracting primary care physician at a flat rate for each patient enrolled in the MCO for a specific time period. 7 Physicians under a capitated arrangement are
paid a pre-determined fixed fee based on the number of patient
subscribers.'
Generally, the MCO will determine the costs of
medical care for each patient on a monthly basis.9 Physicians receive the same amount of money for each patient enrolled in the

MCO on a monthly basis regardless of the services provided to the
patient or the cost of the services.' Thus, if a patient requires no
medical services during a particular month, the physician still receives her monthly payment. If a patient, however, requires an
excessive amount of medical attention beyond projected amounts,
the physician receives no additional payment for the service rendered to the patient.6
Under a capitated system, the financial risk of caring for the
enrollees shifts to the primary care physician. 2 When MCOs contract with physicians under a capitated reimbursement system,
the MCO places a financial risk on the physician for medical costs
which exceed the capitated rate for each patient.' The primary
care physician has a vested financial interest in the amount of
note 56, at 302.
In the 1990s private payers increasingly contracted with provider entities under capitated arrangements. Id. at 301. The providers constitute either a group of physicians working with one hospital or a group of physicians,
hospitals and health care professionals. Id. The private payers are generally
employers or insurers on their behalf. Id. States have implemented capitated
arrangements for Medicaid and Medicare recipients to control rising costs.
Id. President Clinton suggested in his health care reform proposal in 1996
that capitation be the primary form of reimbursement in health care plans
and in paying for services for Medicaid and Medicare recipients. Id.
57. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1364-65. For the purposes of this Comment
this definition suffices, nevertheless, capitation is actually much more complex than merely setting a flat rate per patient per month. Blum, supra note
56, at 174. The methods used to determine capitated rates per patient are
complicated and require trained professionals with a thorough understanding
of health care costs. Stanley, supra note 3, at 60. Actuarial data along with
consideration of patient utilization patterns in specific health care plans and
in the marketplace in general are used to calculate capitated rates. Id. Historical data or industry wide statistics are used to estimate the utilization and
cost of medical services per patient. Id. The MCOs profits and administrative
costs are also included in the rate. Id. Consideration is also given to other
factors such as age, gender and the type of group being covered. Id. Setting
capitation rates and negotiating contracts under a capitated arrangement involve complicated financial analysis which includes knowledge of a physician's
average fees, utilization rates and income. Blum, supra note 56, at 174.
58. Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 158.
59. Stanley, supra note 3, at 59.
60. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1827.
61. Stanley, supra note 3, at 59.
62. McGraw, supra note 3, at 1827.
63. Gordon J. Apple, Who Bears the Risk When Physicians are also Insurers?, 78 MINN. MED. 23, 23 (1991).
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medical care that exceeds the capitated amount." The result of
capitation is that MCOs pay physicians a fixed level of compensation regardless of the amount of medical services they provide to
managed health care subscribers. Capitated reimbursement
schemes also put physicians at risk for costs that exceed the capitated amount per patient.m
While utilization review and capitation are the two most
widely used cost containment mechanisms, MCOs commonly implement payment incentives as an extra benefit for physicians that
limit various medical services.6
C. Payment Incentives

While capitation provides an incentive for primary care physicians to limit their direct medical services and time spent with
patients, it may not be the most effective method to reduce the
overall costs of medical treatment provided to each patient. 7
Physicians utilize many different services in the treatment and
care of their patients enrolled in an MCO.' For example, a patient
may need the expertise of a specialist or require a diagnostic test.'
If a physician is being reimbursed for his medical services at a
fixed rate per patient regardless of the time spent with the patient
or the service provided to the patient, the physician is then motivated to decrease his time spent with the patient and to increase
the use of other medical services such as diagnostic tests and referrals to specialists.70 While a capitated reimbursement system
will decrease the costs of the physician's own services for the MCO,
the excessive use of outside services will result in an increase in
the overall costs of medical treatment provided to the patient.71
MCOs, therefore, utilize payment incentives such as risk
pools, bonuses and expanded capitation to decrease a primary care
physician's use of referrals, diagnostic tests and other services."
These payment incentives not only attempt to encourage physicians to use fewer outside services, they can also reward the physician financially for minimizing the number of referrals, tests and
medical services.7" Payment incentives are employed to control the
64. Id. at 24.
65. Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160.
66. Zoloth-Dorfman & Rubin, supra note 1, at 349.
67. Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 159.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 159-60. Physicians may also increase the use of outside medical
services to insure proper diagnosis and to decrease the risk of liability for

medical malpractice. Id. at 160.
71. Id. The increased use of medical services outside the MCO threatens
the financial stability of the MCO. Bearen & Maedgen, supra note 22, at 294.
72. Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160.
73. Noah, supra note 2, at 1227.
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over utilization of outside medical services and attempt to encourage physicians to provide cost effective case-management techniques.'
Under a withhold risk pool, a portion of the physician's capitated payment is withheld and put into a risk pool."5 In some instances, the risk pools are divided into hospital risk pools and/or
referral risk pools.7" Money put into the risk pool is then used to
pay for referrals to specialists and hospitalization expenses. 7' At
the end of an accounting period, physicians receive any remaining
funds left in the pool. 78 However, if no money remains in the pool
due to a high number of referrals or inpatient stays, the physicians
must share in the loss.71 Withhold pools attempt to encourage
physicians to contain costs by giving physicians a share of the pool
if referrals and the use of high technology health services are kept
to a minimum. 0
Bonuses are similar to risk pools.8 The MCO rewards the
primary care physician for referring less patients and requesting
fewer diagnostic tests and procedures.82 However, instead of withholding a percentage of the physicians' fees, in a bonus arrangement, the MCO sets aside additional funds at the beginning of the
year to pay for outside medical services such as referrals and diagnostic tests." At the end of the year, the MCO pays any funds remaining to the physicians in the form of a bonus above and beyond
each physician's capitated compensation.'
Expanded capitation attempts to encourage physicians to
minimize costly medical treatment by including ancillary services
for each patient in the physician's capitated payment. 5 The capitated payment for each enrollee includes the primary care physi-6
cian's own expenses, tests, referrals and other medical services.
Thus, the physician's own income pays for diagnostic tests and referrals to specialists.87
While cost containment mechanisms such as utilization review, capitation and payment incentives are the central focus of
MCOs, most patients and physicians perceive cost controlling limi-

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Latham, supra note 30, at 402-04.
Id. See Stanley, supra note 3, at 62 (giving an example of a risk pool).
Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
Latham, supra note 30, at 404.
Id.
Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
Latham, supra note 30, at 404.
Maxwell, supra note 22, at 35.
Latham, supra note 30, at 403.
McGraw, supra note 3, at 1828.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tations as a threat. Cost effective measures encourage physicians
to under utilize medical services which thereby strain the physician-patient relationship.88 Disgruntled patients who question a
physician's motivation when necessary medical treatment is not
provided now seek redress in court with a host of legal theories
against primary care physicians and their MCOs. Part III examines various theories plaintiffs assert in court against primary care
physicians and MCOs for instituting cost containment measures
such as utilization review, capitation and payment incentives. Although the theories vary in success, they dictate the future direction of managed care.
III. EXPANDED THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR PHYSICIANS AND MCOS
The conflict of providing quality health care to a patient
while at the same time attempting to contain costs results in expanded liability for physicians and MCOs."9 Patients who are in-

88. John V. Jacobi, Patientsat a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers

through Data Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 710 (1997).
As the health care industry moves toward managed care and away from traditional medicine, the physician-patient relationship is altered. Id. at 706-07.
The physician-patient relationship is viewed as a fiduciary relationship.
whereby the physician owes his patient a fundamental duty to put the patient's medical needs above all other personal interests. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 23 (1986). A patient places complete trust

in his doctor to care for him and provide the best medical treatment possible.
AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethics in Managed Care, 273
JAMA 331 (1995) [hereinafter AMA Council]. A doctor takes a Hippocratic
oath to provide the best possible medical care for the sick above all other interests. Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the FiduciaryMetaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in a ChangingHealth Care System, AM. J.L. &

241, 246 (1995). The relationship between the patient and physician is
held in the highest regard, as the most important relationship in medicine.
AMA Council, supra, at 331. However, managed care introduces a third party
into the previously exclusive doctor-patient relationship. As a provider in a
MCO, a physician must abide by his ethical duty to the patient to provide the
best medical treatment possible, and at the same time adhere to cost containment mechanisms and limitations set forth in their contracts with the
MED.,

MCOs. David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-PhysicianRelationship,5 HEALTH MATRIX, 141, 149 (1995). Cost containment mechanisms

such as utilization review, capitation and payment incentives limit treatment
and encourage health care providers to cut costs. Freiburg, supra note 2, at
588. A physician has an ethical and legal duty to put the patients needs first;
however, the pressure to contain costs and the incentive to make more money
by cutting treatment costs may cloud a physician's judgment about a patient's
medical treatment. See Orentlicher, supra, at 149. When determining medical treatment for a patient, a doctor should not consider what is best for the
managed care plan. Freiburg, supra note 2, at 588. Nevertheless, through bonuses and other incentives, the MCOs pressure physicians to do just that or
risk personal financial ruin. Orentlicher, supra, at 158.
89. Chittenden, supra note 41, at 476.
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jured because cost containment mechanisms limited their treatment are attempting to attack cost containment mechanisms in
court.'
Injured patients have claimed that cost containment
mechanisms influence a physician's judgment to limit or deny
treatment, referrals or other medical services."' Patients use
common causes of action such as negligence, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract and tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship to allege that cost containment mechanisms were the cause of their injury.' When cost containment
mechanisms interfere with the physician's medical treatment and
result in injury to the patient, courts find it difficult to determine
who should be found liable and under what theory of law.9
90. Richard C. Reuben, With More Patients Suing HMOs for Denial of
Treatment Lawyers are Exploring Ground in Going up Against the Managed
Care Giants, 82 ABA J. 55, 55 (Oct. 1996).
91. Id.
92. Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
93. The Employee Retirement Income & Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts a vast majority of private claims against qualified MCOs. ERISA was
originally promulgated to provide cost-effective protection over employee
pension plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). See Manuel, supra note 42, at 545.
ERISA provides a cost effective uniform regulation for employee benefit plans
.so as to "assure American workers that they may look forward, with anticipation, to a retirement with financial security and dignity." H.R. REP. No. 93533, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646. Lower administrative costs in managing the pension funds arguably provide greater benefits
to the plans' beneficiaries. Peter M. Mellette & Jane E. Kurtz, Corcoran v.
United Healthcare,Inc.: Liability of Utilization Review Companies in Light of
ERISA, 26 AM. HOSP. ASS'N. J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 129 (1993). However, because the final version of the legislation regulated employee pension plans
and employee benefit plans, health and benefit plans, including qualified employer managed care, was regulated under ERISA. Manuel, supra note 42, at
545. ERISA's inclusion of qualified employer health plans is significant because Congress enacted a preemption clause in ERISA which supersedes state
laws which relate to covered plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). ERISA, therefore, preempts a broad range of state laws, including certain actions for injuries and wrongful death actions resulting from negligence by a health care
plan's physicians or administrators and limits a beneficiaries remedies to contract damages. Jack Kilcullen, Gropingfor the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice and EnterpriseLiability, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (1996). The effect of the
broad preemption is to leave some employees without recourse when an administrator or physician in a managed health care organization commits a
tort. Mellette & Kurtz, supra, at 129.
ERISA's preemption over employee tort actions is significant because
ERISA now covers more than 50% of all American workers. Kilcullen, supra,
at 9. According to one prominent plaintiffs attorney, Mark Heipler, who has
successfully challenged the administrative structure of an HMO in relation to
a malpractice claim, "ERISA eliminates about 70 percent of all potential HMO
cases, leaving only those clients [that are] covered by [either] governmentsponsored plans ... " or individual plans to seek recourse against HMO's.

Grinfeld, supra note 42, at 48 (citing Mark 0. Heipler, an attorney who has
represented several patients in suits against HMOs).
The Fifth Circuit initially addressed the broad preemptive interpreta-
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tion of ERISA and the judiciary's growing concern for plaintiffs who are left
without recourse against managed care in Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc.,
965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). In Corcoran,the plaintiff who was a member of
a qualified employer health plan under ERISA needed hospitalization during
her last month of pregnancy due to a history of miscarriage. Id. at 1324.
When her obstetrician requested the month-long hospitalization, United
Healthcare, the utilization review firm who monitored the plan, denied the
request and authorized ten hour a day home nursing care instead. Id. Two
weeks later, when the home nurse was not on duty, Mrs. Corcoran's baby
went into fetal distress and died. Id.
The Corcorans filed an action against United Healthcare and Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, the managed health care plan. Id. at 1324. The case
was removed to federal court where the defendants argued that ERISA's preemption clause barred the Corcorans' wrongful death action. Id. at 1324-25.
The district court judge granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
holding that ERISA preempted the Corcorans' action on the basis that the
damages claimed for improperly handling a claim were asserted against the
administrators of the plan. Id. at 1325. On appeal, the Corcorans argued that
the state traditionally authorizes their negligence claim and that the claim
does not seek to regulate the administration of the plan in violation of ERISA.
Id. at 1330. In addition, plaintiffs argued that if their claim is preempted,
they are left without a remedy. Id. at 1338. The appellate court rejected
plaintiffs' arguments with regret and noted that although United Healthcare
made medical decisions and rendered medical advice through its utilization
review, it did so in the context as an administrator in the plan. Id. at 1332.
In rationalizing its decision, the court broadly interpreted the preemption
clause as follows:
By its very nature, a system of prospective decisionmaking influences
the beneficiary's choice among treatment options to a far greater degree
than does the theoretical risk of disallowance of a claim facing a beneficiary in a retrospective system. Indeed, the perception among insurers
that prospective determinations result in lower health care costs is
premised on the likelihood that a beneficiary, faced with the knowledge
of specifically what-the plan will and will not pay for, will choose the
treatment option recommended by the plan in order to avoid risking total or partial disallowance of benefits.
Id. at 1332.
Despite the broad preemptive interpretation of ERISA in Corcoran,recent cases permit negligence claims against managed care by distinguishing
between the administration of the plan, which is preempted by ERISA, and
the quality of the plan, which is not preempted. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that there is nothing in the
legislation history of ERISA that required a medical malpractice action or
negligence claim to be heard in federal court); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F.
Supp. 343 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (remanding plaintiffs malpractice claim back to
state court after the district court judge rejected the defendants' preemption
argument).
In light of the recent court decisions which distinguish the scope of
ERISA's preemptive power by attacking the quality of the health care plan
rather than the administrator of the plan, various groups, including the AMA,
seek to sponsor legislation to help control the quality of health care. See Grinfeld, supra note 42, at 49, 85 (quoting Carol O'Brien, counsel for the AMA, as
saying that the AMA has been "trying to avoid some of the ERISA
[preemption] problems by drafting laws that don't look like direct economic
hits on the plan, and then by trying to fashion laws that apply to all HMOs").
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A. The Legal Attack on Utilization Review
As discussed in section A of Part II, the most common type of
cost- containment mechanism used to reduce health care costs is
utilization review. An MCO typically hires a utilization organization to review physicians' treatment decisions. A utilization reviewer has a strong interest in minimizing the amount of treatment to patients which can create a conflict for a physician who
determines that a treatment is medically necessary for his patient.
Although the MCO may deny treatment, the physician is responsible for the treatment and care of the patient. Therefore, the
question becomes, who is responsible when a physician stops
treating a patient because the MCO denies coverage for the treatment and the patient is injured as a result. The following three
cases address who is liable when negligent utilization review results in injury to a patient.
1.

Wickline v. State of California
The first case to challenge the impact of cost-containment
mechanisms implemented by MCOs was the highly publicized case
of Wickline v. State of California.9' The cost-containment mechanism that allegedly caused injury to the plaintiff in Wickline was
prospective utilization review.' Wickline is the seminal case to
address whether a primary care physician and/or MCO may be
held liable for a denial of necessary medical treatment."
Louis Wickline was admitted to the hospital for problems with
her back and legs.'
She was subsequently diagnosed with
Leriche's Syndrome and was forced to undergo surgical treatment. 8 Louis was eligible for medical benefits under Medi-Cal, a

94. Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see
also Andrea Jean Lairson, Reexamining the Physician'sDuty of Care in Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 62 WASH. L. REV. 791, 799

(1987) (discussing the novelty of the issues presented in Wickline).

95. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662. See also Chittenden, supra note 41, at
476 (discussing the facts and holding of Wickline). See supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text for a discussion on prospective utilization review.
96. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662. See also Panah, supra note 3 (stating
that Wickline was the fist case to address the issue of liability of third party
payors when denied medical treatment results in injury to a patient).
97. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663.
98. Id. at 663-64. A peripheral vascular surgeon diagnosed Louis with
"arteriosclerosis obliterans with occlusion of the abdominal aorta" which is
commonly referred to as Leriche's Syndrome. Id. at 663. Leriche's Syndrome
is caused by the blockage of the terminal aorta. Id. Arteriosclerosis, a thickening of the artery walls, caused an obstruction in Louis' aorta above the point
where the aorta divides into two separate arteries that descend into each leg.
Id. Louis' doctors felt surgery was necessary to correct Louis' condition and
determined it was necessary to replace part of Louis' artery with a "synthetic
(Teflon) graft." Id.
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California state administered Medicaid program." Medi-Cal preauthorized Louis' hospital admission and surgery."° After surgery,
however, complications arose, and Louis underwent two additional
emergency surgeries.1 1 When the time came for Louis to be discharged, the physician concluded that due to Louis' unstable condition, it was necessary for her to remain in the hospital."° However, a Medi-Cal consultant, board certified in surgery, denied the
treating physician's request for the additional hospital stay.1°3
Soon after Louis' discharge from the hospital, her leg became infected.' Although she was in extreme pain, Louis waited a few
days before calling the treating physician."°5 Subsequently, the infection in Louis' leg became untreatable and life threatening."
99. Id. at 664; Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical Malpractice Law and Health
Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103
YALE L.J. 1297, 1304 (1994).

100. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
101. Id.
102. Id.; Pedroza, supra note 18, at 421. After the "synthetic graft" was inserted into Louis' leg, she began to experience circulatory problems. Wickline,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 664. The doctors determined that a clot had formed and

immediately took Louis back into surgery. Id. After the second surgery,
Louis' began experiencing severe pain, spasms in her leg, and hallucinations.

Id. She was brought into surgery a third time for a lumbar sympathectomy, a
procedure performed to stop the spasms in her blood vessels. Id. The spasms
Louis experienced stopped the blood from flowing from the vessels and therefore caused the clotting. Id. After the procedure, Louis' doctors determined
that it was "medically necessary" for Louis to remain in the hospital for eight
more days. Id. The physicians feared infection and clotting and felt that they
could save Louis' leg from being amputated if they could watch her closely.
Id.
103. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 665. Medi-Cal required the hospital in
which Louis received treatment to fill out a "Request for Extension of Stay in
Hospital" (request form). Id. at 664. The request form required Louis' physician to provide information regarding Louis' "diagnosis, significant history,
clinical status and treatment plan" in order to allow a Medi-Cal representative to make a "reasonable professional" decision about the extension. Id. at
664-65. A hospital nurse responsible for the request form submitted it to
Louis' doctors for their signatures. Id. at 665. Louis' physicians testified that
the request form was complete and accurate. Id.
A Medi-Cal 'on-site nurse" reviewed the form and decided not to approve the request. Id. While Medi-Cal's "on-site nurse" had authority to approve the request form, she could not deny the request without consulting a
Medi-Cal physician consultant. Id. After reviewing the request form, the
Medi-Cal physician consultant determined that only a four day extension of
hospital stay was necessary. Id. at 666. The physician consultant based his
conclusion on the fact that the form did not mention Louis' temperature, diet
or bowel movements, and that it indicated that she could walk without help
and was receiving whirlpool treatments. Id. The physician consultant therefore determined that Louis' health was progressing and that she was not seriously ill. Id.
104. Id. at 667.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 668.
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Louis was admitted back into the hospital and her leg was amputated. 7 Louis brought suit against the State of California claiming that Medi-Cal's prospective utilization review process was
negligent." She alleged that due to the Medi-Cal consultant's
negligent decision to limit her request for additional hospital stay
from eight days to four days, the doctors released her prematurely
which resulted in the amputation of her leg."09
A jury found for Louis and awarded her $500,000." 0 The
Court of Appeals of California however, reversed the trial court
and held that Medi-Cal was not liable for medical malpractice as a
matter of law."' According to the court, the Medi-Cal consultant's
decision complied with the standards set forth in the California
statutes which governed the state's Medi-Cal program."
The
court found that the patient's physician is responsible in determining the medical necessity of a patient's treatment."' It was the
physician's responsibility, the court concluded, to make an effort to
appeal Medi-Cal's decision and to keep Louis in the hospital if, in
his medical judgment, it was necessary to do so."' The court
stated that a physician is in a much better position to evaluate and
diagnose a patient's condition and therefore has the ultimate responsibility for medical decisions. " '
The Wickline Court determined that Louis' treating physician
and not Medi-Cal made the decision to discharge Louis and, therefore, the physician was responsible for the discharge." 8 The court
107. Id.
108. Id. at 662. See also E. Jane Ross, Refusing to Pay for Health Care-Part
II (of III): Emerging Trends in Third-Party Payer Liability, PROGRESS IN
CARDIOVAScULAR NURSING, Spring 1996, 40, 40 (using the Wickline case to

illustrate emerging trends in third-party payor liability).
109. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662; Ross, supra note 108, at 40-41.
110. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 662; Ross, supra note 108, at 41.
111. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
112. Id. at 671; Pedroza, supra note 18, at 423-24. The chief Medi-Cal physician consultant testified that the standard which governs approval or denial
of requests for extension of hospital stay is "medical necessity for the length
and level of care requested." Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670. The medical necessity of the extension is determined by the information provided on the request form. Id. The Medi-Cal physician consultant is required to use his
"skill, knowledge, training and expertise" when he denies or approves an extended hospital stay. Id.
113. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
114. Id. at 671.
115. Id. at 670.
116. Id. at 671. The court emphasized that while Louis' doctors knew MediCal only approved Louis' hospital extension for four days, none of them contacted Medi-Cal to demand a further extension. Id. at 666. Two of Louis' doctors testified that they felt it was medically proper to discharge Louis when
they did because her condition had not worsened or become life-threatening.
Id. The senior doctor responsible for Louis testified that upon discharge,
Louis' condition had not deteriorated or changed since Medi-Cal's denial of the

1997]

Cost ContainmentMechanisms

also emphasized that a physician must protest or make efforts to
proceed with the treatment denied by a third party payor if in his
medical judgment the treatment is necessary."7 A physician cannot escape liability by placing blame on a third party payor for decisions the physician made." 8
Although the court found the treating physician responsible
for Louis' injuries, the court did not close the door on third party
payor liability."9 The court recognized that a prospective utilization review process contains greater risks than a traditional retrospective utilization review process.' If an MCO determines a procedure is not medically necessary in a retrospective utilization
review process, the patient's reimbursement is wrongfully withheld.'2' However, if an MCO concludes that a patient's treatment
is not medically necessary under a prospective utilization review
process, the patient could suffer serious physical injury or death. 2'
The court stated:
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals made on a patient's behalf for
medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.'2
The court concluded its opinion by admitting that what was
really at issue in Wickline was the effect of cost containment
mechanisms on a physician's medical judgment.'
The court
stressed that cost containment mechanisms must not be allowed to
eight-day extension. Id. He therefore felt that he had no information that
would change Medi-Cal's decision to allow Louis to stay in the hospital. Id.
The doctor also testified that he felt Medi-Cal had authority over him to determine when Louis should be released from the hospital. Id.
117. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670-71.
118. Id. at 671.
119. See id. at 670 (stating "[a] patient.., who is harmed when care should
have been provided... should recover.., from all those responsible... including, when appropriate, health care payors"). See also Pedroza,
supra note 18, at 422 (quoting the court's dicta that health care payors may be
held liable).
120. See Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (noting that errors in the prospective review process can possibly result in a patient's death whereas errors in
the retrospective utilization review process will only result in the provider not
being paid for his services). See also Ross, supra note 108, at 41 (noting that
the court's recognition of this possibly lethal difference).
121. See Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (stating '[a] mistaken conclusion
about medical necessity following retrospective review will result in the
wrongful withholding of payment").
122. See id. (stating that "an erroneous decision in a prospective review
process ... in practical consequences, results in the withholding of necessary
care, potentially leading to a patient's disability or death").
123. Id. at 670-71.
124. Id. at 672.
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interfere with a physician's medical judgment.'25
2.

Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California

MCOs relied on the decision in Wickline for many years to
protect them from liability for utilization review or cost containment decisions that result in injury to a patient."6 However,
MCOs became reluctant to use the Wickline decision as rational to
deny benefits to their enrollees after the California Court of Appeals denied summary judgment motions brought by private insurance companies and a utilization review entity being sued for
negligent utilization review." 7
In Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California, Howard Wilson was admitted into a hospital for drug dependency, anorexia
and depression. 8 The treating physician, after evaluating Howard, determined that it was medically necessary for Howard to remain in the hospital for three to four weeks for observation and
treatment.2 9 Authorization for the hospital stay from Howard's
private insurance company was necessary.'3° The utilization review entity employed by Howard's insurance company determined
that he did not meet admission criteria and denied further benefits
after his eleventh day in the hospital. 3' Howard was released
from the hospital due to his inability to pay his own
medical
3
costs. ' Twenty days later, Howard committed suicide.1
Howard's parents brought suit against Howard's health insurance companies, the entity that performed utilization review of
the medical necessity of hospital stays and the entities' employees
for breach of the insurance contract, negligence and wrongful'
death.' The trial court, relying on Wickline, reasoned that Howard's treating physician was responsible for his discharge from the
hospital and granted the defendants' summary judgment motions." 5 The California Court of Appeals, however, holding that
125. Id.
126. Pedroza, supra note 18, at 422. The court in Wickline found that physicians and not MCOs are responsible for any medical decisions made regarding the patient. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
127. Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 885 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
128. Id. at 877.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 877; Adrienne M. Zibelman, The Practice Standard of Care and
Liability of Managed Care Plans, 27 HEALTH & HosP. L. 204 (1994), available
in LEXIS, GenMed Library, Med &Health Jnl File.
132. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
133. Id. at 878.
134. Id. at 880.
135. Id.; See also Zibelman, supra note 131 (discussing cases in which plaintiffs have sued their health insurance companies for injury resulting from a
denial of coverage).
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the insurance companies and utilization review organization were
not entitled to summary judgment, reversed the trial court and
remanded the case.'38 Ultimately, the utilization review entity
settled with Howard's parents and a jury found the insurance
company liable for breach of contract.'37
The court of appeals distinguished Wickline on many of the
issues raised by plaintiffs and found much of the language in Wickline to be dicta.'38 First, the Wilson court stated that Louis Wickline received benefits through a state administered Medicaid program that the California Administrative Code governs whereas
Howard Wilson received benefits through a private insurance
company." 9 According to the Wilson court, the decision to deny
benefits in Wickline met the medical standard of care defined in
the California Administrative Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code. " These Codes allowed a Medi-Cal consultant to review coverage for a patient and to deny coverage when appropriate. " The decision made by Medi-Cal met the medical standard of
care defined in the codes which was the "usual standards of medical practice in the community." "' The decision to discharge Howard by his private insurance company, however, raised a question
of fact for the jury. "'
Second, the Court of Appeals also distinguished Wickline on
the basis that the payment of benefits in Wickline was not pursuant to a contract but to provisions of a code.'" This altered normal
tort liability rules which provide that all persons are responsible
for their own acts and for preventing others from being harmed by
their conduct as a result of lack of ordinary care." 5 In Wickline
there was a public policy exception to general tort liability rules
found in the applicable codes which mandated utilization review
and allowed Medi-Cal to deny benefits to Louis." However, in
Wilson, the court stated that there was no public policy exception
in the contract between Howard and his insurance company. " "
The court disagreed with the defendants' argument, that the Wickline decision can be interpreted to mean that a strong public policy, in favor of utilization review, provides a health insurance

136.
137.
138.
139.

Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
Frankel, supra note 99, at 1308.
Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
Id. at 878-79.

140. Id.

14L Id. at 879.
142. Wickline v. State of California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 670-71 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986).

143. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883; Pedroza, supra note 18, at 423.
144. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 879.

145. Id.
146. See id. at 884 (discussing the Wickline opinion).
147. Id.
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company that denies benefits immunity from general tort liability.' 8 Thus, applying general joint tort liability rules in Wilson,
the court stated that any defendant whose negligent conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs injury is liable."9
The court in Wilson found that there was enough evidence to determine that the utilization review decision to deny benefits to
Howard was a substantial factor in Howard's death. 5° In Wilson,
one of the treating physicians testified that Howard's inability to
pay for the treatment was the sole reason for the patient's discharge, and that Howard would probably be alive had he stayed in
the hospital.1" The court relied on the treating physician's testimony to hold that there was enough evidence to raise an issue of
fact as to whether the defendants' conduct was a substantial factor
in Howard's death."' 2
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' main argument
that, based on Wickline, Howard's treating physician had a responsibility to challenge the utilization review decision and was,
therefore, responsible for Howard's discharge and death."
The
court found that the language in Wickline, stating that the discharge is the sole responsibility of the physician, was dicta and
unnecessary for the decision of the case. 5 The court characterized
the language as "broadly stated" and emphasized that it did not
"correctly state the law relative to causation issues in a tort
case."
Therefore, the Wilson court opened the door for injured
plaintiffs to sue their MCOs if denial of benefits is a substantial
factor in the patient's injury and reversed the rule that physicians
are solely responsible for all discharge decisions."
148. Id.
149. Id. at 883. The elements ofjoint tort liability are:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another
[because] (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability
because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431,(1965).

150. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
151. Id. at 882-83.
152. Id. at 883.
153. Id. Although the court stated that the language in Wickline requiring a
physician to pursue an appeal to a denial of benefits was dicta, they also set
forth many other valid reasons for rejecting the defendants' argument. Id. at
884-85. The physician's failure to pursue an appeal to the denial of Howard's
benefits did not warrant a summary judgment for defendants. Id. Howard's
physician's were not a party to the lawsuit. Id. There was a question of
whether Howard's policy with the insurance company allowed utilization review. Id. Lastly, the defendants never proved that the request for further
hospital stay would have been granted had Howard's physicians appealed. Id.
154. Id. at 883.
155. Id. at 880.
156. See supra notes 138-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
holding in Wilson. See also, Ross, supra note 108, at 42.
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3. Fox v. Health Net
In Fox v. Health Net, 57 Physicians diagnosed Nelene Fox with
breast cancer and recommended a bone marrow transplant." After much delay, Nelene's HMO determined that the transplant was
experimental due to her advanced stage of cancer and denied coverage for the transplant." Nelene and her family, through fundraising efforts, obtained enough money to have the transplant."6 1
Unfortunately, Nelene died shortly after the transplant.
Nelene's husband sued her HMO for breach of contract, bad faith
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 62
Nelene's husband argued that Health Net denied his wife's
transplant because of financial incentives which were implemented to encourage physicians to reduce medical costs.'6 He
claimed that Health Net denied the transplant despite Health
Net's written policy which specifically covered bone marrow
transplants and a study performed by Health Net which showed
that bone marrow transplants were successful in three out of four
other HMO's.'"
Under the bad faith claim, Mr. Fox argued that Health Net
created financial incentives and bonus schemes which "intend[ed]
to or recklessly insure[ed]"'6 that Health Net executives' decisions
157. Fox v. Health Net, Case No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993).
158. Trial Brief at 1, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28,
1993).

159. Trial Brief at 3, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28,
1993).

160. Trial Brief at 4-6, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
28, 1993). See also Manuel, supra, note 42, at 542 (discussing liability for
physicians under managed care).
161. Manuel, supra note 42, at 542.
162. Trial Brief at 7, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28,

1993).
163. Id. at 33.
164. Zibelman, supra note 131.

Two witnesses testified for Mr. Fox that

significantly helped his case. Ross, supra note 108, at 44. The first witness
was a Health Net employee that developed breast cancer. Id. She was initially denied coverage for a bone marrow transplant by Health Net, however,
Health Net subsequently approved the transplant claiming the procedure was
only approved because she had been an employee for so long. Id. The witness
filed a motion to join in Mr. Fox's suit because she felt Health Net was delaying its approval. Id. Soon thereafter Health Net officially approved the
transplant. Id. The witness also revealed that the money for her transplant
came from a pool of funds Health Net reserved for bone marrow transplants.
Id. There was over four million dollars in Health Net's bone marrow fund
when Nelene was denied her transplant. Id. The second witness testified
that she was granted a bone marrow transplant only because Health Net
feared a wrongful death action. Id. These two witnesses refuted Health Net's
arguments that Health Net did not pay for bone marrow transplants and that
the transplants were unsuccessful. Id.
165. Trial Brief at 34, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
28, 1993).
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to deny or approve treatment were prejudiced by financial decisions.' 6 Mr. Fox also presented evidence that two financial incentive plans influenced the Health Net executive's decision to deny
Nelene's treatment.'67 The first incentive provided the executive
with a bonus equal to 20% of his salary based on the financial
condition of Health Net at the end of the year/U The second incentive plan provided bonuses to the executive based upon the results of his individual efforts to lower medical costs.'o Mr. Fox argued that the incentives created a conflict of interest and made it
difficult for the reviewer to objectively determine whether to deny
or approve treatment.7 ' He also argued that the incentive plans
encouraged Health Net executives to deny treatment for their own
financial gain. 7'
A jury awarded Mr. Fox 12 million dollars in compensatory
damages and 77 million dollars in punitive damages.7 2 Health Net
subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. 73 Prior to the court's
ruling on Health Net's
motion, however, the parties settled for an
74
undisclosed amount.
The three cases discussed above are examples of the various
theories of liability plaintiffs' use against physicians and MCOs
when negligent utilization review results in injury. Capitation
and payment incentives are also challenged in court as being the
substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries.
1

B. The Legal Attack on Capitationand Payment Incentives
As previously discussed in Section B of Part II, capitation reduces health care costs by providing physician's with a set fee per
patient per month. 75 Capitation schemes use financial incentives
to encourage physicians to minimize medical services and make
cost-conscious decisions regarding treatment. Further, under a
capitated reimbursement system a physician is burdened with the
financial risk for the delivery of care. Therefore, financial incentives create a conflict between the physician's duty to the patient

166. Id.
167. Ross, supra note 108, at 44. See Trial Brief at 33-34, Fox v. Health Net
No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993) (discussing the two financial incentive plans the HMO implemented.)
168. Ross, supra note 108, at 44.
169. Id. at 44-45.
170. Trial Brief at 33-34, Fox v. Health Net, No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
28, 1993).
171. Id.
172. David Leon Moore, Ethics Pinched by the System, Lawyer Says, U.S.A.
TODAY, Jan. 22, 1996, at 2D.
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of capitation.
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and the physician's personal financial concerns. If financial incentives are the motivating factor in denying a patient's treatment
and the patient is injured as a result, the physician and/or the
MCO can be held liable. Therefore, capitated reimbursement systems and the use of financial incentives expand liability for physicians and MCOs. In the following three cases, plaintiffs allege financial incentives implemented by the MCO encouraged their
physicians to deny treatment and referrals which resulted in their
injury.
1. Pulvers v. KaiserFoundationHealth Plan
One of the first cases to challenge financial incentives and
risk sharing was Pulvers v. Kaiser FoundationHealth Plan.'8 Mr.
Pulvers allegedly died from the mistreatment of Bowen's Disease.'77 Mr. Pulvers originally sued his health insurance company,
Kaiser Health Plan, and his physician for medical malpractice.'78
Subsequently, during the pleading stage of the trial, Mr. Pulvers
died and his wife stepped in as plaintiff to the lawsuit.'79 Mrs. Pulvers amended the complaint and added the following additional
causes of action: breach of warranty, fraud and wrongful death.'
At trial, a jury found for Mrs. Pulvers on the fraud count but found
for the defendants on the medical malpractice claim.'' The trial
court granted a new trial on the wrongful death and fraud issues
and granted judgment on the pleadings on the breach of warranty
"'
claim. 82
Mrs. Pulvers appealed the decision.8 3 For most of the
causes of action pled in the complaint, Mrs. Pulvers alleged that
the financial incentive plan implemented by Mr. Pulvers' HMO encouraged physicians to refrain from ordering necessary tests and
medical treatment to lower costs for the insurance company. ' "
Mrs. Pulvers asserted that the HMO fraudulently led them to believe they would receive "the best quality of care and treatment." 85
However, she argued that the plan implemented financial incentives to encourage its physicians to limit tests and treatment
which made it impossible to achieve a high standard of care.'
The California Court of Appeals rejected Mrs. Pulvers' argu176. Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979).

177. Id. at 393.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Mr. Pulvers' two children also brought an action against the two
defendants for wrongful death. Id.
181. Id.
182. Pulvers, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 393-94; Chittenden, supra note 41, at 480-81.
185. Pulvers, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
186. Id.; Chittenden, supra note 41, at 480-81.
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ment and held that the Federal HMO Act" 7 requires financial incentive plans and that professional groups use financial incentives
to reduce health care costs." The court further stated, "we can see
in the plan no suggestion that individual doctors act negligently or
that they refrain from recommending whatever diagnostic procedures or treatments the accepted standards of their profession require."' The Court of Appeals thus affirmed the trial court's refusal to allow Mrs. Pulvers to pursue a cause of action against the
defendants for not meeting the medical standard of care due to financial incentives implemented by the insurance company."
2. Bush v. Dake
In 1990, another closely watched case went to trial which
again attacked the financial incentives of an HMO, however, it
was never officially reported. 9' In Bush v. Dake, Ms. Bush, an
HMO member, alleged that her HMO implemented financial incentives which led to her physician's negligent medical treatment." Ms. Bush argued that her primary care physician failed to
perform a pap smear and failed to refer her to an obstetrician
which may have lead to an earlier detection of her cervical cancer."3 She claimed that the cost containment mechanisms implemented by her HMO were a substantial factor in her physician's
failure to provide quality health care to her." Ms. Bush sued the
HMO and the physician for negligence, gross negligence, fraud,
breach of trust and tortious interference with the physicianpatient relationship. 5 Ms. Bush's HMO required her to seek
treatment from her primary care physician for any medical problems. "' A specialist would be recommended for plaintiff only if the
primary care physician deemed it necessary. 7 Further, the HMO
reimbursed Ms. Bush's primary care physician under a capitated
system. 99 The HMO also implemented risk pools for referrals to
specialists and patient hospitalization stays.' 99 If the primary care

187. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-300e-17 (1997).

188.
189.
190.
191.

Pulvers, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Paul Craig, Health Maintenance Organizations Gatekeeping Policies:

PotentialLiability for DeterringAccess to Emergency Medical Services, 23 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 135 (1990), available in LEXIS, GenMed Library, Med &

Health Jnl File.
192. Panah, supra note 3.
193. Craig, supra note 190.
194. Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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physician's recommendations for referrals and hospital stays were
minimal throughout the year, more money was left in the risk pool
at the end of the year for distribution.2 5' Ms. Bush alleged these
financial incentives caused her primary care physician to delay a
pap smear and referral to a specialist which thereby delayed the
timely diagnosis of cervical cancer.0 1 She argued further that the
HMO implemented a financial incentive system which tortiously
interfered with the patient-physician relationship and violated
public policies that existed to protect the patient-physician relationship.0
Ms. Bush's HMO moved for summary judgment motion arguing that financial incentives were consistent with public policy. '°
They argued that public policy favored lowering health care costs
and thus favored financial incentives.'
The HMO also argued
2 5
that the "incentive to malpractice was illusory" for three reasons. 0
First, there is no evidence that financial incentives implemented to
control costs are more influential than the fee-for-service system
which can influence a physician to over-utilize medical services.2
Second, quality assurance programs implemented by the HMO
counterbalance any negative influence financial incentives have on
physicians."
Third, a physician's fear of medical malpractice
claims, concern with professional pride, and human compassion
insure that a physician will not allow financial incentives to cloud
his judgment.2

The Michigan Circuit Court denied the HMO's motion for
summary judgment, however, it also found that financial incentives are not against public policy.2 0 9 The court held that the ques-

tion of whether a financial incentive program caused a physician
to provide inadequate care, thereby committing malpractice, is a
question for the jury. 20 Therefore, although cost containment
mechanisms are not against policy and in fact are required by
public policy, a jury can determine that financial incentives effected a physician's medical judgment. 21' The court left the door
open for liability against HMOs when it can be proven that

200. Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
201. Craig, supra note 190.
202. Chittenden, supra note 41, at 481.
203. Id.

204. Id. at 482.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Chittenden, supra note 41, at 482.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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financial incentives caused a contracting physician to commit
medical malpractice.212
3. Ching v. Gaines

In a recent California case, a prominent attorney attempted to
blame capitation for his client's death.2 3 Concerned MCOs
watched carefully as the case proceeded to trial.214 In Ching v.
Gaines,215 Joyce Ching sought treatment from her primary care
physician for pain and discomfort she was having in her stomach
and rectum. 16 After receiving some treatment from the primary
care physician, Joyce's pain did not subside."' Joyce requested
additional tests and referrals to specialists for months, but her requests were ignored. 8 Joyce's primary care physician did not refer her to a specialist for her condition for over three months.219
Finally, she was referred to a gastroenterologist who diagnosed
Joyce with stage four colon cancer that had perforated her bowel
wall.' The cancer was extensive and inoperable."' Subsequently,
Joyce died.m
Joyce's husband sued the physicians and their medical group
for medical malpractice, wrongful death and breach of fiduciary
duty.'
Mr. Ching alleged that Joyce employed a physician to
treat and diagnose her condition and that the physicians undertook the duty to do so.' The physicians that agreed to treat Joyce
had medical expertise and training upon which Joyce relied.' Mr.
Ching argued that Joyce's reliance on her physicians' medical expertise created a fiduciary relationship between Joyce and her
physician.2' Mr. Ching alleged that as a fiduciary, a physician has
various duties which include acting on the patient's behalf to provide the best possible care and treatment, undertaking all necessary actions in the interest of the patient, placing the patient's interests above financial interests or interests of the MCO, and
212. Id.
213. Leslie Nicholson, PhysiciansFailedto Diagnose,But HMO off the Hook,
3 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRATEGY, 5, 5

(1996).

214. Marie C. Infante, The Legal Risks of Managed Care, Legally Speaking,
RN, Mar. 1996, at 57.
215. Ching v. Gaines, No. CV-137656 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Nov. 15, 1995).
216. Third Amended Complaint at 3, Ching v. Gaines, No. CV-137656 (Cal.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 15, 1995).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Third Amended Complaint at 4, Ching, No. CV-137656.
223. Id. at 1-5.
224. Third Amended Complaint at 3, Ching, No. CV-137656.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 6.
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disclosing all information that affects the patient's condition. 7
Mr. Ching alleged that Joyce's physicians breached their fiduciary duty to her by negligently treating her, failing to refer her
to a specialist due to financial gain, and failing to disclose information about the payment incentives. m The physicians treating
Joyce were part of a capitated MCO, each physician received
$27.94 per month for her treatment.m Any costs above the $27.94
came out of the physicians' pockets.' ° Mr. Ching alleged that
Joyce was not immediately referred to a specialist because her
physicians were encouraged to limit referrals and tests and because money for referrals came from the physician's own pockets."'
The physicians, therefore, had a financial incentive to restrict patient referrals to specialists which conflicted with their fiduciary
duty to Joyce.m Mr. Ching also alleged that her physicians had a
duty to disclose information about the financial incentives to Joyce
because it affected her treatment."3 Allowing financial incentives
to influence a decision about medical treatment, Mr. Ching alleged, constitutes negligent conduct.2" The physician's negligent
conduct thus directly resulted in Joyce's death. m
A jury awarded Mr. Ching 3 million dollars, however, a California law reduced the award to $700,000.2s However, when calculating damages, the jury was not allowed to consider the breach of
fiduciary duty count.2 7 On the eve of trial, the judge granted defendant's motion for nonsuit on the breach of fiduciary duty
claim.' A breach of fiduciary duty claim, the judge held, requires
a duty and a breach of that duty. 9 The physicians in the Ching
case did not have a fiduciary duty to disclose financial incentives
to their patient"' Therefore, if the physicians had no duty to disclose information to Joyce, there was no duty to breach. The judge
in Ching was concerned that if he allowed the breach of fiduciary
duty to be tried he would open the door to new law which would
require physicians in HMOs to disclose all financial arrangements
with patients prior to treatment. 24' Concerned with the conse227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Moore, supra note 172, at 1D.

230. Id.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Nicholson, supra note 213, at 5.
Third Amended Complaint at 6, Ching, No. CV-137656.
Id.
Id.

236. Grinfeld, supra note 42, at 48.
237. Nicholson, supra note 213, at 6.
238. Id.
239. Reporter's Partial Transcript of Proceedings Sept. 7, 1995, at 30-35
Ching, No. CIV-137656.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 31, 34.
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quences of allowing the breach of fiduciary duty count to be tried,
the judge concluded that he was not responsible for making new
law which required physicians to disclose financial incentive information to patients.'
He also determined that the defendants
would have no defense against this claim.2'
It is apparent from a brief discussion of the cases mentioned
above that courts differ in their views as to which party should be
held liable when a plaintiff is injured due to a cost controlling
measure. Some courts hold physicians solely responsible for any
medical decisions while other courts hold MCOs liable for cost containment mechanisms that interfere with a physician's medical
judgment. It is also apparent that managed care is successful in
lowering health care costs and is here to stay. Therefore, standards must be in place for physicians and MCOs to follow in a
managed care setting. In addition, guidelines or rules must be
created to dictate the interaction between physicians, patients and
MCOs.
IV. PROPOSALS
The purpose of MCOs is to provide its participants with quality health care at a reasonable cost. The system is designed to efficiently allocate quality medical services to a pool of participants.
In order to efficiently allocate medical services, MCOs implement
several cost containment mechanisms including the aforementioned utilization review, capitation and bonuses to help keep costs
of quality health care down. Evidence suggests that MCOs and
their cost containment mechanisms help contain the cost of quality
medical services.2 " However, cost containment measures, as well
as resource constraints inherent in the managed care system, create a conflict of interest between physician and patient.2 5 Financial incentives in the form of cost containment arguably function to
limit a patient's treatment options within a given MCO. Whether
the MCO or the primary care physician controls cost limitations,
the tenuous relationship found between physician and patient under managed care is fraught with conflict and distrust. The prevailing opinion held by the patient is that the physician no longer
242. Id.
243. Id. at 32.
244. George J. Church, Backlash Against HMO's, TIME, April 14, 1997 at
32. Managed care has resulted in a "welcome reduction in the runaway
growth of medical costs." Id.
245. Id. According to David Lawrence, Chairman and CEO of KaiserPermanente, California's nonprofit managed care program, "[in the fee-forservice days, there was a very perverse system that rewarded doctors for doing way too much medicine; now we have a system [under managed care] creating incentives that do too little." Id. at 32. Dr. Alan Fogelman, head of
UCLA's Department of Medicine, cryptically notes that "People who are sick
will be able to die because it is the best economically." Id.
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acts as the patient's advocate." 8
Although commentators agree that managed care may lessen
the impact financial incentives have on primary care physicians,
some authors suggest that MCOs require a comprehensive overhaul which includes a prohibition on all cost containment mechanisms." Others argue that the ethical obligation and applicable
standard of care for physicians in MCOs must be modified to reflect the structural restraints inherent in the particular health
care plan.'

246. The portion of premiums allocated for patient care in any managed care
plan is called "medical loss ratio." Church, supra note 244, at 32. According
to the AMA, for-profit HMO's allocate approximately seventy percent for
every dollar of premium received from its subscribers; the remaining 30% is
allocated for administrative costs and profits. Id. at 32-33. Church suggests
that non-profit managed plans tend to allocate a larger percentage of premium payments to health care services. Id. Alternatively, under the traditional fee-for-service arrangement previously available through Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 96% of each dollar of premium paid for health care services. Id.
at 33. Unfortunately, under the traditional fee-for-service arrangement,
much of the money allocated to health care services may be considered excessive. Id. Clearly, non-profit managed care plans that function without needing to feed shareholders' demand for dividends allocate a higher percentage of
premiums to health care services. Id.
247. David Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 169-70. One widely accepted
modification to the financial incentives offered to primary care physicians is to
expand the physician incentive payments from single physicians to groups of
physicians who care for and treat large pools of patients. Id. at 168-69. Dr.
Orentlicher contends that if MCOs payments are based upon the performance
of large groups of physicians rather than single physicians, the impact of the
payment incentives and hold-backs would be significantly lessened because a
larger cross section of patients would be used to calculate the ratio of referrals
and diagnostic tests. Id. at 168. Therefore, although the physician may feel
the repercussions of excessive referrals, the financial impact on the physician
will be spread to the entire physician practice group. Id.
See RODWIN, supra note 18, at 232-33; Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr.
1994, 28, 35-36. Both authors argue that even moderate financial incentives
imposed by managed care on primary care physicians can cause patients to
question the physician's commitment and responsiveness to the patient's
needs. Id. If financial incentives are therefore banned, the physician will
once again act as the patient's advocate. Id.
248. Robert I. Field, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 581, 585-586 (1996)
(reviewing E. HAAvI MORREIM, BALANCING ACT: THE NEW MEDICAL ETHICS
OF MEDICINE'S NEW ECONOMICS (1995)). Professor Morreim, a Professor of
Human Values and Ethics at the College of Medicine at the University of
Tennessee, argues in her book that developments in managed care require the
creation of two separate standards of care for a primary care physician. Id.
The standards are called the "standard of medical expertise" and the
"standard of rescue use". Id.
The "standard of medical expertise" represents the traditional standard
of care wherein a physician's acts or omissions are evaluated on whether the
acts comply with what a reasonably well qualified physician would do in like
or similar circumstances. Id. The second standard, termed the "standard of
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While each recommendation has certain appeal, the recommendations ignore the practical reality of managed care. As an alternative, this Comment proposes that although cost containment
mechanisms should remain in place, MCOs and primary care
physicians must fully disclose each material financial incentive
and resource constraint in the managed care system before the
patient consents to treatment. The Comment also suggests that
the standard of care remain fixed on what a reasonably wellqualified physician would do in like or similar circumstances regardless of the constraints in the health care plan.
A. FinancialIncentives are Necessary To Ensure Efficient
Allocation of Quality Health Care
Managed care, and its use of cost containment mechanisms,

such as utilization review, capitation and financial incentives, was
created to help stem the rising cost of quality health care."49 Under
the fee-for-service arrangement physicians over-utilize medical
services and in turn drive up the cost of quality medical care. Although the long term impact of managed care on the health care
industry is unknown, the short term effect of managed care is to
lower the cost of quality health care.2 °
resource use," contemplates the services and resources available to the patient that the MCO will reimburse. Id. Professor Morreim argues that under
the "standard of resource use" the physician has the obligation to inform the
patient of all the financial incentives in the health care system and its resource constraints. Id. Medical negligence is in turn based upon the resources available to the physician under the particular managed care system.

Id.
249. Health care spending in the U.S. rose from $675 billion in 1990 to $950
billion in 1994. Martin & Bjerknes, supra note 42, at 435. (citing from
BARBARA H. FRANKLEN ET. AL., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS
FORECASTS FOR 350 INDUSTRIES: U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1993 42-1 (1993)

and Robert Pear, Health Costs are Growing More Slowly, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1996, at A13).

Moreover, total medical expenditures over the years have skyrocketed.
In 1960, medical expenditures totaled $27.1 billion and rose to $74.4 billion in
1970, $250.1 billion in 1980 and $422.6 billion in 1985. Iglehart, supra note 4,
at 965. Government officials believe that if current growth rates in medical
expenditures continue, health care expenditures will account for 16% of the
gross national product of the U.S. by the year 2000. Sally T. Sonnefeld, Projections of National Health Expenditures Through the Year 2000, 13 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 1, 1 (1991).

250. From 1994 to 1995, HMO premium payments have declined. See Eric
Larson, The Soul of an HMO, TIME, Jan. 22, 1996, at 45, 47 (stating that the

Health Care Financing Administration attributed the deceleration of health
care to the leveling off of the cost of private health care benefits). See also
Arnold Birenbaum, Managed Care: Will It Be For Everyone?, USA TODAY,
July 1996, at 46 (explaining that HMO's are an alternative form of cost effective health care). Many state run Medicare and Medicaid programs are now
shifting into managed care systems to save money and improve the quality of
health care. Ingelhart, supra note 4, at 900.
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The prohibition of cost containment mechanisms eliminates
the incentive to render only medically necessary services. Without
a financial incentive to render only necessary medical service,
physicians will ultimately prescribe potentially excessive diagnostic tests and treatments in order to insulate themselves from liability. The excessive diagnostic tests and treatments will lead to additional cost which the managed care plan will pass on to its
subscribers. In the end, managed care's sole purpose of providing
affordable health care will be lost.
B. Full Disclosureby MCOs and Physicians will Level the Playing
Field and Promote Resolution with Patients
The use of cost containment mechanisms make physicians
aware of the costs of medical treatment and help to lower costs.
However, MCOs must be given some limitations on the use of cost
controlling measures so that the quality of health care is not compromised. The MCO and physician must provide full disclosure to
the patient about the system's cost containment mechanism. Full
disclosure provides patient awareness of the physician's cost limitations and allows the patient to participate in the decision making of his own medical treatment.2 1
New rules governing how managed care organizations structure their physician incentive arrangements support the notion
that a physician's payment incentives should be disclosed to the
patient.m However, the Health Care Financing Administration's
251. Professor Morreim also encourages full disclosure of all financial incentives and resource constraints. See Morreim, supra note 12, at 80. Professor Morreim believes it is essential to educate each MCO subscriber on the
resource limitation inherent in the system in order to hold the participant responsible for cost effective treatment. Id. If the patient has a financial interest in his care and treatment, he will listen to treatment alternatives and
participate as a partner in his treatment course. Id. at 101. However, David

Mechanic and Mark Schlesinger suggest that requiring a physician to disclose
information about the payment methods may actually reduce the patient's
trust in his physician. Mechanic & Schlesinger, supra note 43, at 1693-96.
They note that currently, the American Medical Association's code of ethics
requires that reimbursement schemes must be discussed with new patients.
Id. However, the authors note that physicians will not disclose payment information to their patients if no enforcement mechanism is in place to deter
physicians from disobeying the requirement. Id. Further, they argue that if a
patient is told about various financial incentives the physician is working under, the patient may have a difficult time understanding how the incentives
work or what they mean. Id. If the patient comprehends how the incentives

work, the patient may develop a great distrust for the physician but have no
other option that remain in the physician's care for covered medical treatments. Id. If disclosure is necessary, Mechanic and Schlesinger believe that
disclosure about the physician's financial incentives occur early in the physician-patient relationship so that the physician, through his care and treatment, may foster trust. Id.
252. In May of 1996, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) is-
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new rules effect only Medicare and Medicaid patients and only require that physicians disclose merely rudimentary financial incentives to an enrollee who asks for the information.'
Although the new rules require some disclosure of certain financial incentives, they do not require full disclosure of all cost
containment mechanisms a physician considers when treating a
patient. Patients have the right to know the financial incentives
that may impact the course of their medical care and treatment.
Full disclosure allows for patient awareness of the available
treatment plans and limitations in the system. In addition, full
sued new rules on how managed care plans structure their physician incentive
plans so as to protect Medicare and Medicaid patients. Harris Meyer, HCFA's
New Take on Physician Incentives, HosP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, May 5, 1996

at 62, 63. The HCFA rules include a limit on potential financial losses to the
physicians if they are at "substantial risk" for referrals. Id. "Substantial risk"
is defined as putting more than 25% of a physician group's potential payment
at risk. Id. HCFA further requires that all Medicare and Medicaid prepaid
plans must disclose the general features of the physician's incentive arrangement to enrollees who ask. Id. If the enrollees do not ask, the physician is
under no obligation to disclose. Id. See BNA's HEALTH LAW REPORTER, New
Jersey: Overhaul of HMO Regulations Focuses on PatientProtections,in NEWS
AND DEVELOPMENTS, Feb. 6, 1997. In New Jersey, the number of residents

enrolled in HMOs grew from 5000 in 1974 to two million in 1996. Id. This
dramatic increase in the number of people enrolled in HMOs prompted the
Health Department and an advisory committee consisting of physicians,
HMOs, nurses, consumers and businesses to create a set of comprehensive
rules that govern HMOs. Id. The rules, which went into effect on March 15,
1997, focus on protecting patients receiving care under HMO plans. Id.
Some of the requirements of the new rules are as follows: a physician
and not an administrator, is required to make decisions regarding approval or
denial of coverage for a treatment; gag clauses are not allowed and physicians
must have freedom to discuss any and all treatment options with their patient; a choice of more than one specialist must be given to patients; patients
with a chronic disability must be referred to specialists that are capable of
treating them; HMOs are required to provide patients with information about
reimbursement systems and financial incentives they implement; patients
must be given a phone number to call for information about payment schemes;
a quality review organization must review HMOs every three years and make
reports to the Health Department; an appeals process must be set up by the
HMO with no penalties to patients; the appeal must be reviewed by a physician; an enrollee must have options to appeal to independent utilization review organization; and HMOs are required to submit data to the Health Department which will be used to create "report cards" which resident of New
Jersey can use to compare HMOs. Id. The New Jersey Department of Health
feels these new rules "are the most progressive consumer-oriented HMO
regulations in the country." Id. They are currently working toward a bill that
would extend the rules to non-HMO MCOs. Id.
253. HCFA officials contend that their new rules will set the standard for all
managed care plans because it will set the standard for physician contracting.
Meyer, supra note 252, at 63. The purpose for drafting the new rules, according to then Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shala, was so that
"[no] patient should have to wonder if their doctor's decision is based on sound
medicine or financial incentives." Id. at 62. Obviously, managed care was not
happy with the new rules referring to them as "needlessly offensive." Id.
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disclosure of the system's payment incentives may endear the patient to the physician and foster trust during treatment. Finally, if
the patient is aware of the financial incentives, he will better understand the delicate cost considerations related to health care.
Therefore, although the trial judge in Ching was rightfully apprehensive about recognizing a duty to disclose, legislation or medical
ethics committees must impose such a duty on physicians and
MCOs to disclose financial incentives to patients. In addition, as
suggested by some authors, patient groups must be established to
evaluate, critique and educate the public on the quality of each
health care organization, so that participants are advised on how
well their organization functions.2"
C. The Standard of Care Must Remain to Ensure Quality Medical
Care
Finally, a physician's standard of care should not be modified
in any way to reflect the constraints inherent in an MCO. 2' The
notion of a modifiable standard of care will fail to promote quality
medical care and will undoubtedly create mass confusion in the
medical and legal communities in determining the appropriate
standard of care.
Structural deficiencies in the managed care system make it
impossible for the physician to comply with the traditional standard of care. Legislation is necessary that sets forth uniform
guidelines for physicians to appeal a denial of service by the managed care system on behalf of the patient. If the physician complies with the guidelines, his actions should exculpate, or act as a
complete defense against, a medical malpractice action by the patient and the patient should then have the right to seek damages
254. Robert N. Butler, Tipping the Scale Back Toward the Patient, 51
GEIATRIcs 8, 8 (1996). Dr. Butler recommends the formation of the Ameri-

can Patients Association (APA) to keep an eye on MCOs and endorse those
organizations which meet certain standards of care. Id. In addition, the APA
would compile patient satisfaction reports and act as a voice for consumers in
setting up standards of care. Id.
In addition to fully disclosing financial incentives to the patient, a physician, prior to joining an MCO, should also evaluate the quality of other physicians in the group and assess any limitation in the system so as to avoid the
risk of medical malpractice claims. Joe Niedzielski, MCO Doctors Face Medical MalpracticeRisks, NAT. UNDERwRrrERS, Nov. 11, 1996 at 9.
255. The traditional theory of medical malpractice is still governed by traditional medicine. Pedroza, supra note 18, at 416. The physician is held to the
standard of care to "use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed
and employed by members in the profession in good standing." Id. Physicians
are expected to perform pursuant to the standard of care and to be the sole
decision maker in the patient's treatment. Id. The legal system continues to
assess medical malpractice under the traditional standard of care, which does
not take into consideration the constraints of a MCO and the goal to decrease
the cost of health care in the U.S. Id.
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against the MCO. In addition, if the physician complies with the
guidelines, the physician should be able to seek damages from the
MCO if he is later dropped form the organization in retaliation for
his appeal.
CONCLUSION

In light of the cases discussed above, patients should be free
to seek damages against MCOs whose system prohibits its participating physicians from complying with the standard of care. With
these recommendations, a series of checks and balances is
achieved between MCOs, participating physicians and patients.
Moreover, financial incentives and resource constraints utilized by
MCOs and physicians must be fully disclosed to patients. The arrangement either fosters trust and disclosure or an uneasy peace
wherein each party has a cause of action at its disposal to ensure
harmony.

